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Abstract
In this paper, we consider a model of multilateral bargaining where homogeneous
agents may exert eﬀort before negotiations in order to inﬂuence their chances of
becoming the proposer. Eﬀort levels have a permanent eﬀect on the recognition
process (persistent recognition). We prove three main results. First, voting rules
are equivalent (that is, they yield the same social cost) when recognition becomes
persistent. Secondly, an equilibrium may fail to exist, because players may have more
incentives to reduce their eﬀort level (in order to be included in winning coalitions)
than to increase it (in order to increase their proposal power). Thirdly, we prove that
the existence problem is driven by the intensity of competition at the recognition
stage. Another deﬁnition of this process enables to ﬁx this problem.
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11 Introduction
Negotiations are common in many important economic problems, such as legislative
bargaining (Baron and Ferejohn 1989, Snyder et al. 2005), international environmental
agreements, litigation processes, issues of corporate governance. Agents taking part in
such processes have incentives to gain power in order to inﬂuence the outcome of the
process. There are plenty of real life situations where agents exert (costly) eﬀorts to
promote their most preferred alternative. For instance, agents can provide services and
contributions to the functioning of their organization in order to increase their chances
of being elected to the executive committee. This in turn will enable them to inﬂuence
the system of decision-making.
The agents’ incentives to buy inﬂuence have been studied in diﬀerent contexts (Evans
1997, Anbarci et al. 2002, Grossman and Helpman 2002, or Board and Zwiebel 2005).
Unlike all these contributions, the main goal of this paper is to compare diﬀerent voting
rules with respect to the social cost resulting from inﬂuence activities. As such, the
closest references are Yildirim (2007, 2010), where the author analyses a sequential
bargaining situation in which agents compete in order to inﬂuence their chances of
becoming the proposer (agents may be heterogeneous). Competition can take place
at a pre-bargaining stage (persistent recognition) or at each stage of the negotiations
(transitory recognition). In Yildirim (2007) the author characterizes unanimity as the
voting rule minimizing the social cost resulting from inﬂuence activities when agents
are identical and recognition is transitory. Then, in Yildirim (2010), he compares both
recognition systems for a given rule (unanimity). Another close reference is Cardona
and Polanski (2012), who analyse a similar type of problem when agents bargain over
a unidimensional issue. The object of bargaining is very diﬀerent from ours, and so are
their results.
The present paper focuses on the case of persistent recognition, where agents exert
eﬀort to inﬂuence their chances of becoming proposers at the beginning of the process,
i.e before the ﬁrst round of negotiation. This is mainly because this type of recognition
seems to be the most appropriate one when considering many important real world
processes, such as legislative bargaining or executive committees in organizations.
Yildirim (2007, Section 6) provides a preliminary analysis of the case of persistent
recognition. Speciﬁcally, he suggests two deﬁnitions of persistent recognition. In the
ﬁrst one, the recognition probability is assumed to be a mix between a transitory and
an exogenous component. The second deﬁnition is the one used in the present paper,
where agents exert eﬀorts once-and-for-all before the negotiation process. In both cases,
2he compares the incentives of agents to exert eﬀort when recognition is either transitory
or persistent in a two-player example. The present contribution complements Yildirim
(2007) by comparing the eﬃciency of the diﬀerent voting rules when recognition is per-
sistent.
The ﬁrst contribution is an equivalence result regarding the social cost resulting
from voting rules. While unanimity is the unique voting rule minimizing the social cost
when recognition is transitory (Yildirim 2007), voting rules are equivalent (in that they
yield the same social cost) when agents are identical and exert eﬀort only once at the
beginning of the process. Speciﬁcally, we focus on the (symmetric) stationary subgame
perfect equilibria (SSPE) of the game (as in Yildirim 2007, 2010) and characterize the
(unique) potential candidate by backward induction. We compute the resulting social
costs and we prove that they coincide for all voting rules.
Our second contribution relates to the analysis of incentives to deviate from the
(unique) candidate for a symmetric equilibrium. We show that, when the (symmetric)
equilibrium fails to exist, this is not because players have incentives to increase their
chances of becoming the proposer (through an increase of eﬀort), but rather because
they prefer to lower their eﬀort level in order to be included in the winning coalition.
In other words, under strict k-majority rules, the incentives to be included in winning
coalitions by the other players dominate individual incentives and create a "race to the
bottom", which eventually destabilises the unique (symmetric) equilibrium candidate.
Thus, a qualitative property of the present model is that the ability to propose is less
important than the ability to be included in winning coalitions. This diﬀers notably
from one of the main conclusions of the literature on bargaining, which highlights the
dominance of proposal rights to deﬁne political power (see Eraslan 2002, or Kalandrakis
2006).
The third contribution is to show that the existence problem is driven by the intensity
of competition at the recognition stage. When recognition probabilities are deﬁned using
Tullock (1980) contest success functions, this intensity is low, all agents exert the same
level of eﬀort, and the race to the bottom occurs. We show that deﬁning the probabilities
to win recognition as a function of the percentage mark-up of the highest eﬀort level (à
la Hirshleifer)1 enables one to push the intensity of competition up, and to ﬁx this issue.
Before moving on to the formal description of the model, there are two important
points that have to be stressed. First, in most of the paper we use a speciﬁc form of
recognition function, which is yet the most widely used form in the literature on rent
1This idea has been suggested by Hirshleifer in the contest literature and formalized by Alcalde and
Dahm (2007).
3seeking (see Tullock 1980). Secondly, except in Section 5, we do not analyse asymmetric
equilibria. The reasons are as follows. The main goal of the analysis is to highlight
the fact that the case of persistent recognition is speciﬁc, since voting rules are shown
to be equivalent in terms of the resulting social cost, and that there are cases where
a race to the bottom emerges at the recognition stage. Compared to Yildirim (2007),
the persistent nature of the recognition process makes it much more diﬃcult to derive
analytically tractable expressions that enable us to compare the diﬀerent voting rules.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The model is introduced in
Section 2 and an illustrative example highlights the main diﬀerence between transitory
recognition and persistent recognition. The unique equilibrium candidate is characterised
in Section 3. The equivalence result prevailing in the homogeneous case is provided in
the same section. The (non) existence problem is analysed in Section 4, and ﬁxed in
Section 5. Section 6 concludes. Proofs that do not appear in the body of the paper are
relegated to an appendix.
2 The model
2.1 Description of the model
We consider the problem introduced by Yildirim (2007, 2010) where n ≥ 2 agents be-
longing to a set N = {1,...,n} bargain over the allocation of a surplus of ﬁxed size
(normalized to one) under a ﬁxed k-majority rule (i.e., the approval of k players among
the n is needed). Agents negotiate according to a bargaining protocol a la Rubinstein
(1982), except that their recognition probabilities are endogenous.
The game has two stages. In the ﬁrst stage, each agent exerts eﬀort at the beginning
of the process, and relative eﬀorts determine each agent’s bargaining power (their recog-
nition probability) for all periods. We assume that, provided agent i exerts eﬀort xi ≥ 0
at the beginning of the process, his recognition probability is given by pi ≡ p(xi,x−i),
where x−i is the vector of eﬀorts of the n − 1 other players. Let x denote the vector of
eﬀorts of the n players. Eﬀort is costly and, in order to keep the analysis as simple as
possible, we assume that the cost of eﬀort is linear (and that all agents have the same
marginal cost of eﬀort), and this cost is denoted by the positive parameter c < 1.
In the second stage, players bargain over a pie of size 1. They convene in periods
t = 1,2,... to divide the pie. In each period, player i is recognized with probability
pi and receives the right to make a proposal to the other players. A proposal s is an












set of feasible allocations, where si is the share agent i receives. The n players then
choose whether to accept or reject the proposal. If at least k players choose to accept
the proposal, the pie is shared according to the proposal.
Each player i derives von Neuman-Morgenstern stage utility ui(s) = si. Players
discount the future by an identical discount factor 0 < δ < 1. Thus, player i’s payoﬀ
from a decision s ∈S reached in period t ≥ 1 is given by δt−1si − cxi. In the event of
perpetual disagreement, this player receives −cxi.
The main goal of the present paper is to compare the diﬀerent voting rules according
to their social costs. Yildirim (2007) provides this comparison in the case of transitory
recognition only when agents are identical. This is due to the complexity of the under-
lying analysis. As a result, we too will focus on the homogeneous case where agents are
identical (same time preferences, same marginal cost of eﬀort).
We will have to impose more structure on the recognition probabilities, especially
to characterize the social cost. Until Section 5, we will use a Tullock contest success
function (TCSF):




l=1 f(xl) if x  = 0,
1
n if x = 0,
, (1)
with f ≥ 0, f′ > 0 and f′′ ≤ 0.
This function has been introduced by Tullock and it has been widely used in the
literature on contests. This is the simplest form of contest success functions with an
axiomatic foundation (Skaperdas, 1996). In order to ﬁx the existence problem that will
be discussed in Section 4, we will use (in Section 5) another form of success function
where recognition probabilities depend on the percentage mark-up of the highest eﬀort
level. Speciﬁcally:
Assumption (HCSF): If one considers agents’ eﬀort levels x1 ≥ x2 ≥ ... ≥ xn then the







where it is assumed that xn+1 = 0. This form has been suggested by Hirshleifer in the
contest literature and studied in Alcalde and Dahm (2007).
5To be consistent with Yildirim (2007, 2010), we will focus on stationary subgame
perfect equilibria (SSPE) in the remainder of the paper. Speciﬁcally, we use the following
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 1 A strategy proﬁle is a SSPE if it constitutes a Nash equilibrium in each
period, and is both stationary (time and history independent) and subgame perfect.
Thus, a SSPE speciﬁes identical actions in each continuation game following the
rejection of an oﬀer. The main reason for using this concept is that it solves the multiple
equilibrium problem that arises in multilateral bargaining. With this equilibrium notion,
it is easily checked that (since δ < 1) any agent has incentives to make an oﬀer that is
immediately accepted.
In the next sections, we will use backward reasoning to characterize the SSPE and
more speciﬁcally the agents’ equilibrium payoﬀs, expected shares of the surplus, and
levels of eﬀort. We will focus on symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria where two identical
players are treated the same (same share of the pie, same eﬀort). In Section 3 the
optimal strategies of the negotiation stage are characterized. In order to rule out cases
where agents might be indiﬀerent between certain strategies, we will have to rely on a
tie breaking rule that will be described in this section. In Section 4, we will analyse the
initial stage of recognition, and we will characterize the equilibrium candidate. Then we
will complete the analysis by ruling out the potentially beneﬁcial unilateral deviations.
We will then show that the social cost resulting from the equilibrium is the same for any
voting rule.
2.2 Comparison of transitory and persistent recognition: an illustrat-
ive two-player case
The present section illustrates how the ranking of voting rules (in terms of social costs)
is aﬀected when recognition is assumed to be persistent instead of transitory in the case
of two players. The case of transitory recognition diﬀers from the model presented above
because instead of choosing an eﬀort xi once-and-for-all before the negotiation phase, as
in the case of persistent recognition (as considered in Yildirim 2010 and in the present
paper), players exert eﬀort at each step of the negotiation process (which is the case
analysed in Yildirim 2007).
With two players, there are only two possible voting rules, unanimity and dictator-
ship. In the case of unanimity, a proposal needs the approval of the other player to be
implemented and in the case of dictatorship, the proposer can share the pie without the
6agreement of the other player. Both the transitory recognition model and the persistent
recognition model coincide in the case of dictatorship. Indeed, when the proposer does
not need the agreement of the other player, he keeps the whole pie. Both cases coincide
with the standard rent-seeking model. Hence, in the case of two homogeneous players,
the payoﬀ of player i = 1,2 is given by:
vi = p(x1,x2) − cxi. (3)
Assuming that (TCSF) holds with f (x) ≡ x, it is easy to check that the unique equilib-
rium is such that x∗
1 = x∗
2 = 1




Let us now compare transitory and persistent recognition under the unanimity rule:
Transitory recognition with two players: Under unanimity, the expected equilibrium
payoﬀ of player 1 satisﬁes (see Yildirim 2007):
v1 = max
x1≥0
{p1 [1 − δv2] + (1 − p1)δv1 − cx1}. (4)
With probability p1, player 1 becomes the proposer and under unanimity he needs to
compensate player 2 (by oﬀering him δv2), and player 2 accepts. With probability
1 − p1, player 2 is the proposer. Player 1 accepts the oﬀer and receives δv1. Similarly,
the expected equilibrium payoﬀ of player 2 satisﬁes
v2 = max
x2≥0
{p2 [1 − δv1] + (1 − p2)δv2 − cx2}. (5)
The equilibrium eﬀort of player i = 1,2 satisﬁes:
∂pi
∂xi
× [1 − δv1 − δv2] − c ≤ 0 ( = 0 if xi > 0). (6)
Assuming that (TCSF) holds with f (x) ≡ x, one can easily show that both players
exert a positive eﬀort, x∗
i = 1




2 (1 − δ (1 − c)). Since δ > 0 and c < 1, the social cost is strictly lower under unanimity
than under dictatorship.
Persistent recognition with two players: the game has two stages; in the ﬁrst stage
players choose their eﬀort, and players bargain in the second stage. We use backward
induction to solve the game. In the second stage, given the eﬀorts x1 and x2, the shares
of the players, s1 and s2 satisfy:
s1 = p1 [1 − δs2] + (1 − p1)δs1, (7)
7and,
s2 = p2 [1 − δs1] + (1 − p2)δs2. (8)
Solving this set of two equations, we obtain si = pi for i = 1,2.
Now consider the ﬁrst stage where the players choose their eﬀorts. The expected
payoﬀ of player i = 1,2 is given by:
vi = si − cxi = p(xi,x−i) − cxi (9)
Hence, as in the case of dictatorship, the game coincides with the standard rent-seeking
model.
At this stage it might be useful to comment on an interesting implication of the above
example. In the transitory case, the equilibrium shares depend on the discount factor δ,
while this is not true when recognition is persistent. The intuition is reasonably simple
if one interprets the above two processes as rent seeking games. Actually, in the case of
transitory recognition, it can be checked that the ﬁrst stage is equivalent to a one-shot
rent-seeking game with (endogenous) prize. For instance, in the case of unanimity, a
simple inspection of the ﬁrst order conditions enables us to conclude that this prize is
equal to 1 − δ(v1 + v2), which is a function of the discount factor. A similar conclusion
holds for a strict k-majority rule (Yildirim 2007, condition (11), pp.176). This implies
that any agent’s equilibrium eﬀort level depends on the discount factor, which leads to
the conclusion that the equilibrium share is a function of this parameter as well. In
the case of persistent recognition, by contrast, Yildirim (2010, Lemma 1) shows that,
when agents have the same discount factor, the ﬁrst stage is equivalent to a one-shot
rent-seeking game in which the prize is equal to 1, and thus does not depend on the
discount factor. This implies then that the equilibrium share does not depend on δ
either. This illustrative example highlights an important diﬀerence between the two
models. Whereas unanimity is the voting rule that (strictly) minimizes social costs in
the case of transitory recognition, the voting rule does not aﬀect social costs in the case
of persistent recognition.
In the rest of the paper, we focus on the persistent recognition model where players
choose an eﬀort in the ﬁrst stage and then the negotiation process takes place. In order
to solve for the SSPE of the present two stage game, we use backward induction. We
will ﬁrst analyse the ﬁnal stage of the game where agents negotiate in order to allocate
the surplus.
83 Symmetric equilibrium
3.1 The negotiation stage
Let us ﬁrst introduce some notations and deﬁnitions: ψij denotes the probability that





vector of such probabilities for player i. It is immediately checked that, under a given
k-majority rule, we must have ψij ∈ [0,1] for all i,j ∈ N, i  = j and
 
j∈N\{i}
ψij = k − 1
for all i ∈ N. As an illustration, consider the case of three players (1,2 and 3). Under
the 2-majority rule, we must have ψ12 + ψ13 = 1, i.e., player 1 includes either player 2
or player 3 in his winning coalition.





shares s = (s1,...,sn) are characterized by:









In words, when agent i is the proposer (which happens with probability pi) he oﬀers to all
members of his winning coalition their continuation values. When he is not the proposer,
he is included in agent j’s winning coalition (when agent j becomes the proposer, which
happens with probability pj) with probability ψji and then receives his continuation
value δsi.
We now characterize the agents’ optimal strategies during the negotiation process
(taking into account that their recognition probabilities are ﬁxed). At this stage of the
analysis we will introduce a tie breaking rule that will explain the type of behavior that
is assumed from identical agents. It will be helpful to avoid cases where agents might
be indiﬀerent between two alternative strategies. We now proceed with the analysis.
Let us consider p = (p1,...,pn) and s = (s1,...,sn). Without loss of generality, we
relabel the players in increasing share. The second stage equilibrium is characterized by
ψ = (ψ1,...,ψn) such that:
















The best reply of player i in the second stage of the game is given by:




1 if sj < sk
≤ 1 if sj = sk
0 if sk < sj
(13)
This characterization leads to the following preliminary result:
Lemma 1 In the equilibrium of the second stage, the vector of probabilities of inclusion,
ψ = (ψi)i∈N, and the vector of shares s = (si)i∈N are functions of (x,δ), with ψi =
ψi (x,δ) and si = si (x,δ) for all i ∈ N. The vector of shares s is the solution of














1 if sj < sk
≤ 1 if sj = sk
0 if sk < sj
(16)
The second stage equilibrium strategies are characterized implicitly. The above result
has a simple interpretation. Any agent will include the agents with the (k −1) cheapest
votes in his winning coalition with certainty, and any other agent is excluded from it.
Before deriving the ﬁrst stage equilibrium, we will show an interesting property of
the second stage equilibrium. To show the result, we need to specify a tie breaking rule
(Anonymity) regarding situations where the votes of two players have the same cost:
Assumption (Anonymity): If sl = sk = si with i  = l, then ψji = ψjl = ψjk if
j  = i,l,k, ψki = ψkl and ψik = ψlk if k  = i,l.
In other words, if two agents i and l (with shares identical to the kth smallest share)
are to be chosen by any other agent j to be part of his winning coalition, then they will be
chosen with the same probability. Moreover, each of agents i,l and k must include (and
be included by) the other two agents with the same probability. We use the following
preliminary result:
Lemma 2 Assume that assumption (Anonymity) holds. Then, in the second stage equi-
librium, we have:
pi ≤ pl ⇐⇒ si ≤ sl.
10The above result relies mainly on the characterization of the equilibrium shares (14).
This lemma implies that the higher the probability of being the proposer, the larger the
agent’s share. It enables us to characterize the agents’ optimal strategies at the last stage
of the game. In order to solve for the SSPE, we go backward and analyse the initial stage
of the game where agents exert eﬀort in order to inﬂuence their recognition probabilities.
In the rest of the paper, we assume that assumptions (TCSF) and (Anonymity) hold.
3.2 The recognition stage
The present sub-section characterizes the potential candidate for a (symmetric) SSPE of
the two stage game, by characterizing the ﬁrst order conditions of the investment game.
The analysis of the existence of the equilibrium is left to the next section. Reasoning
backward, the ﬁrst stage equilibrium of the game is the equilibrium of a one-shot game
where the payoﬀ of player i is given by vi (x,δ) = si (x,δ) − cxi, with xi ≥ 0. The rest
of the paper will focus on the symmetric equilibrium of this one shot game.
A symmetric equilibrium of the one shot game is characterized by x∗ = (x∗,...,x∗)
such that





, for all xi ≥ 0 and all i, (17)
with,
si = pi (1 − wi) + δµisi, for i = 1,...,n. (18)
Using Lemma 1 and relabelling the players in increasing share, we have:
wi =
 
wk + δ (sk − si) if si ≤ sk







= 1 − pi if si < sk
≤ 1 − pi if si = sk
0 if sk < si
, (20)
This new expression of the equilibrium shares will be used in the next sub-section.
3.3 Voting rules and social cost
In the present section, we characterize the unique candidate for a symmetric equilibrium
and compare the social cost for the diﬀerent possible voting rules.
Proposition 1 Whatever the voting rule (1 ≤ k ≤ n), the candidates for a symmetric
11equilibrium are the Nash equilibria of the contest game with contest success function p.








Let us provide some intuition for the above result. First, the case of dictatorship is
quite simple. The proposer gets everything at the bargaining stage. At the same time,
an agent who is not the proposer gets nothing. This implies that the equilibrium share
at the negotiation stage is simply the probability that the agent is the proposer, and the
pre-bargaining stage is then equivalent to a contest where the size of the prize is equal
to one. The corresponding level of eﬀort is well known from the contest literature. Now,
as the number of agents required for a share to be agreed upon increases, the (expected)
share oﬀered to the other agents (as an aggregate) should become larger, the higher
the number of agents required. Thus, the share secured when an agent becomes the
proposer decreases. Moreover, as the majority requirement increases, the chance that a
given agent (who is not the proposer) becomes part of the winning coalition increases.
This results in a higher payoﬀ when this agent is not the proposer. Under the symmetry
assumption, these two eﬀects have the same magnitude, and the pre-bargaining stage is
again equivalent to a contest with a prize of size one. Hence, we obtain the same levels
of eﬀort.
We have shown that x∗ is the unique candidate for a symmetric equilibrium. As
mentioned previously, the above result has an interesting implication. Endogenous re-
cognition has diﬀerent eﬀects depending on whether it is transitory or persistent. Spe-
ciﬁcally, under transitory recognition the unanimity rule yields the lowest social cost
resulting from inﬂuence activities. Under persistent recognition, all voting rules yield
the same cost. This can be summarized as follows:
Corollary 1: Provided that a symmetric SSPE exists, all voting rules yield the same
social cost.
It remains to analyse the conditions under which the symmetric SSPE exists. This
is the aim of the next section.
4 Existence of the symmetric equilibrium
Let us begin the section by the following result:
Lemma 3 Whatever the voting rule (1 ≤ k ≤ n), no player has an incentive to deviate
12from the symmetric equilibrium by increasing his eﬀort.
The intuition for this result can be stated as follows. When a player deviates from the
symmetric equilibrium by increasing his eﬀort by an inﬁnitesimal amount, this translates
into an inﬁnitesimal increase in his probability of being the proposer, and a downward
jump in his probability of being included in any other player’s winning coalition (which
falls to 0). Hence, the players are worse oﬀ when they increase their eﬀort with respect
to the symmetric equilibrium candidate.
Now it remains to analyse what happens if an agent decides to decrease his eﬀort
level (with respect to the candidate equilibrium level) for a strict k-majority, and if
unanimity/dictatorship is required. In the case of unanimity and dictatorship, it is easy
to check that the symmetric equilibrium always exists. Indeed, in both cases, the payoﬀ
of player i is given by vi (x,δ) =
f(xi) P
j f(xj) − cxi (when at least one of the players’ eﬀort
levels is strictly positive) and it is concave in xi.
This proves the ﬁrst claim of the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Under the unanimity rule and the dictatorship rule, the symmetric equi-
librium always exists. Under the strict k-majority rule (2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1), the symmetric
equilibrium fails to exist because each player has incentives to lower his eﬀort.
The proof of Proposition 2 shows that players have incentives to deviate from the
symmetric equilibrium candidate by reducing their eﬀort. The main intuition is that the
agents face a trade-oﬀ with endogenous recognition. On one side, as they increase their
eﬀort, the chances that they become the proposer increase, which might result in a higher
payoﬀ. On the other side, a higher probability of becoming the proposer makes an agent’s
vote more expensive. This decreases his chance to be included in a winning coalition (in
case a strict k-majority rule is used) if he is not the proposer, and this might result in a
lower payoﬀ. At the symmetric equilibrium candidate, the second eﬀect dominates. This
eﬀect is strong, since a very small decrease in the player’s eﬀort induces a small decrease
in his probability of being the proposer; but this has a large eﬀect on his vote, which
now becomes the cheapest one. The agent is then included with certainty in all the
winning coalitions at the negotiation stage, which increases notably the payoﬀ received
when the agent is not the proposer. This result also highlights an important diﬀerence
between transitory and persistent recognition. Whereas an equilibrium generally exists
when recognition is transitory, it fails to exist for majority rules in the case of persistent
recognition. Moreover, the reason why the symmetric equilibrium does not exist is an
interesting qualitative property of negotiations where recognition is persistent. Lemma
133 and Proposition 2 show that the equilibrium fails to exist only because of the race to
the bottom described above. Players have no incentive to increase their eﬀort from the
symmetric equilibrium (candidate). This is a quite unexpected and interesting result in
the bargaining literature because players usually beneﬁt from being the proposer (see
Eraslan (2002)).
5 Discussion and extension
Before concluding the paper, it might be useful to provide some additional interpreta-
tions for the results obtained, and to discuss some limitations. First, the equivalence
result obtained in section 4 requires further explanation. Speciﬁcally, it has been demon-
strated that the unanimity rule is equivalent to one speciﬁc k-majority rule, namely the
1-majority rule, or dictatorship. Symmetric SSPE exist in both cases and yield the
same social cost. As such, a third party in charge of the organization of negotiations
and interested in minimising the social cost resulting from inﬂuence activities would be
indiﬀerent between requiring unanimous consent or a 1-majority rule.
A second implication of Proposition 2 is that a symmetric SSPE fails to exist under
any other majority requirement. If one thinks of symmetric equilibria as a simple form
of strategies, then a possible interpretation of this non-existence result would be that
one will not be able to predict the outcome of negotiations in a simple way (under strict
k-majority rule with 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1).
This raises an additional point. There are two potential ways to look at the non-
existence result. First, one might consider it as an interesting result per se, since it is
a speciﬁc feature of the case of persistent recognition. When recognition is transitory,
equilibrium existence is not an issue. Moreover, if one interprets the ability to propose
as a way to deﬁne bargaining power endogenously, this property highlights an important
characteristic of situations where the parties’ power during negotiations is persistent
and endogenous. Speciﬁcally, it is not the agents’ incentives to increase their chances to
propose that create a problem, but rather their willingness to be included in the other
parties’ winning coalitions. By contrast, the usual conclusion of the literature assuming
an exogenous recognition process is that a higher bargaining power is proﬁtable. The
present result suggests that this is not a robust feature of participative processes. We
consider that these are interesting conclusions resulting from the analysis.
Secondly, one might be willing to know if this non-existence result is generic. The
problem is that the intensity of competition at the ﬁrst stage is suﬃciently low so that
the unique equilibrium candidate is entirely symmetric, that is, all agents exert the
14same positive level of eﬀort. Due to this symmetry, a race to the bottom occurs and
destabilizes the candidate.
We show in the next proposition that one way to ﬁx this issue is to deﬁne the recog-
nition process by using another form of recognition probabilities that pushes the degree
of competition up (and makes the equilibrium candidate asymmetric). Speciﬁcally, we
consider a three agent example, and we can state:
Proposition 3 Consider that recognition functions are deﬁned using Assumption (HCSF)





, for any voting rule (1 ≤ k ≤ 3) the SSPE equilibrium exists and the eﬀort
levels are characterised as follows:
• Two players are active and one abstains from exerting eﬀort;
• Each active player exerts an eﬀort level equal to x∗ = 1
2c.
A few remarks are worth noticing. There is no assumption relying speciﬁcally on
the number of agents in the above proof. Thus, the result can be extended to more
than three agents. Speciﬁcally, there would still be only two active agents (see Alcalde
and Dahm 2007), and all remaining players would abstain from exerting eﬀorts. The
only diﬀerence is that the characterisation of the bounds of the intervals ensuring the
existence of SSPE might vary.
Secondly, using this new deﬁnition of the recognition stage enables to ﬁx the exist-
ence problem for k-majority rules with 1 < k ≤ n − 1. SSPE exist and are not strictly
symmetric, but are all outcome equivalent (they all result in the same equilibrium ef-
forts). This asymmetry in the agents’ contributions at the ﬁrst stage enables to ﬁx the
existence issue. By lowering his eﬀort by a small amount it is not possible any more to
increase an agent’s probability to be included in winning coalitions to a suﬃcient level,
and the race to the bottom disappears.
Thirdly, all voting rules (unanimity and strict k-majority rules) share the same equi-
librium outcome. This implies that all voting rules are then equivalent, which reinforces
the conclusion of Corollary 1.
6 Conclusion
The issue of buying inﬂuence in collective decision making is extremely important as it
is prevalent in many real world economic situations (lobbying in legislative bargaining,
15international negotiations, composition of executive committees in economic organiza-
tions). There are many questions related to this issue. The present contribution ana-
lyses a multilateral bargaining situation where recognition is persistent and endogenous.
Voting rules are compared with respect to the social cost resulting from them. It is
demonstrated that this comparison diﬀers notably depending on the type of recognition
that is considered. While unanimity is the only voting rule minimizing the social cost
when recognition is transitory, voting rules become equivalent as soon as recognition be-
comes persistent (provided a symmetric equilibrium exists). We also show that (unlike
the case of transitory recognition) the symmetric equilibrium may fail to exist because
of a race to the bottom. Indeed, players may have incentives to reduce their proposal
power in order to be included in the winning coalition. Finally, we highlight that one
way to ﬁx the existence problem is to redeﬁne the recognition process in order to push
the intensity of competition (at the lobbying stage) up.
These conclusions stress the fact that one should be cautious when thinking about the
choice of the appropriate voting rule in collective decision making situations, especially
when inﬂuence activities might be used.
One promising avenue for further research is to analyse the problem when agents are
heterogeneous in order to assess the impact of heterogeneity on the robustness of the
present results. We hope to contribute to this line in the near future.
Appendix
Proof of Lemma 2: The share of player t = i,j is given by:
st = pt (1 − wk − δsk + δst) + µtδst
=
pt
1 − δ (pt + µt)
(1 − wk − δsk). (22)








1 − δ (pi + µi)
. (23)



























≤ pi; a contradiction.
To show that si ≤ sj ⇒ pi ≤ pj, consider p and s with si ≤ sj and pj < pi. If
si < sj, the proof above can be used to obtain a contradiction. Assume that si = sj
and pj < pi. If si = sj  = sk, we have µi = µj, and using (22) we have pj = pi, a
contradiction. Assume that si = sj = sk; notice that
µi − µj = pjψji − piψij, (26)
and using (Anonymity), we have ψji = ψij and then µi = µj + (pj − pi)ψij. Using (22)

















Since ψtl ≤ 1 for all t  = l and
 
t∈N




> 0. We conclude
that pj = pi, a contradiction.￿
Proof of Proposition 1: First consider the case of unanimity, k = n. The shares of






Now assume that k ≤ n − 1. In a symmetric equilibrium, players’ eﬀorts are the same,
xi = xj for any i,j ∈ N. According to Lemma 2, the players have the same share,
si = sj for any i,j ∈ N. The share of player i ∈ N is then given by:











Using the fact that
 












17Summing over the set of agents, we obtain:
 
j
sj = 1. (32)
Thus, the share of player i is given by:
si = pi. (33)
Hence, whatever the voting rule (1 ≤ k ≤ n), the candidates for a symmetric equi-
librium are the solutions to, for any i:
Max
xi≥0
(pi (xi,x−i) − cxi). (34)









In an interior (symmetric) equilibrium, we have
(n − 1)f (x∗)f′ (x∗) = c(f (x∗) + (n − 1)f (x∗))
2 . (36)
Hence,
(n − 1)f (x∗)f′ (x∗) = c(f (x∗) + (n − 1)f (x∗))
2 . (37)








To complete the proof, notice that x = (0,...,0) cannot be an equilibrium since any
player has an incentive to deviate from this situation and exert an inﬁnitesimal eﬀort.￿
Proof of Lemma 3: Assume that one agent (say 1) deviates from x∗ by exerting eﬀort
x1 > x∗. According to Lemma 2, this implies s1 > s, where s1 denotes the share of
player 1 and s denotes the share of all agents 2,...,n (those shares resulting from the
vector of eﬀort (x1,x∗,x∗,...,x∗)). This and assumption (Anonymity) imply that the
new equilibrium strategies at the second period are:







where i = 2,...,n and j  = i. This yields the following characterisation of the equilibrium
shares:
s1 = p1[1 − δ(k − 1)s], (40)
and







where p1 is the probability that player 1 is the proposer and p is the probability of each
agent i ≥ 2. Solving the above set of equations, we obtain:
s1 = p1
n − 1 − δ (k − 1)










= [n − 1 − δ(k − 1)]
f (x1)
(n − 1)[(n − 1)f (x∗) + f (x1)] − δf (x1)(k − 1)
. (43)






= [n − 1 − δ(k − 1)]
f (x1)
(n − 1)[(n − 1)f (x∗) + f (x1)] − δf (x1)(k − 1)
− cx1.
(44)
The above function is easily checked to be strictly concave. Moreover, we obtain the








[n − 1 − δ(k − 1)]f′ (x1)(n − 1)2f (x∗)




[n − 1 − δ(k − 1)](n − 1)2 f(x∗)
f(x1)










[n − 1 − δ(k − 1)]n2(n − 1)
[(n − 1)n − δ(k − 1)]2 c − c
= −
 
n2 − 3n + 2
 
− δ(k − 1)
[(n − 1)n − δ(k − 1)]2 c < 0. (46)
19Since the payoﬀ of player 1 is not continuous at point x∗, we now have to compare
v1 (x∗) and the equilibrium payoﬀ of player 1, v∗
1 (x∗) = 1
n − cx∗. We obtain:
v1 (x∗) − v∗
1 (x∗) =
n − 1 − δ(k − 1)





This rules out the possibility of a proﬁtable deviation for values higher than x∗.￿
Proof of Proposition 2: Under the unanimity rule and the dictatorship rule, the func-
tional form of the shares does not change when one player deviates from the symmetric
equilibrium, we still have si = pi even out of equilibrium. It is suﬃcient to notice that p
is concave with respect to xi (for any i) to show that the symmetric equilibrium always
exists.
Now assume that 2 ≤ k ≤ n − 1. We know that x∗ is the unique candidate for a






Now we study players’ unilateral incentives to deviate from this candidate. Let us
assume that agent 1 deviates by choosing x1 < x∗. According to Lemma 2, this implies
that s1 < s, where s denotes the equilibrium share of agents 2,...,n and s1 denotes the
equilibrium share of agent 1. This implies that the new equilibrium strategies at the
second period are:







where i  = j and i = 2,...,n. This yields the following characterisation of the equilibrium
shares:
s1 = p1[1 − δ(k − 1)s] + (n − 1)pδs1, (50)
and














[n − 1 − δ(k − 1)]f (x1)
(n − 1)(1 − δ)[(n − 1)f (x∗) + f (x1)] + δf (x1)(n − k)
. (52)







[n − 1 − δ(k − 1)]f (x1)
(n − 1)(1 − δ)[(n − 1)f (x∗) + f (x1)] + δf (x1)(n − k)
− cx1. (53)
For x1 = x∗, the diﬀerence with the equilibrium payoﬀ is
∆ ≡ v1 (x∗) − v∗
1 (x∗)
=
n − 1 − δ(k − 1)





One can easily check that ∆ has the same sign than n2 − 2n + 1 > 0.￿
Proof of Proposition 3:
First, for the case of unanimity and dictatorship, a reasoning similar to the one used
in the main part of the analysis enables us to conclude that si = pi for any agent i at
the negotiation stage. Thus, at the ﬁrst stage, the problem is equivalent to a one-shot
rent seeking game where the contest function is deﬁned by (??), and the prize is equal
to one. The result then follows from Alcalde and Dahm (2007, Theorem 2.1).
We now prove the result for the case of k = 2 by focusing on the situation where
agents 1 and 2 are active. Thus, we will prove that x∗
1 = x∗
2 = x∗ and x∗
3 = 0 is sus-
tained as a SSPE outcome. Let us ﬁrst consider that agent 1 deviates by exerting eﬀort
x1 > x∗
2 = 1
2c. This implies that agent 3 is still the agent with the cheapest vote at the
second stage. Using the characterisation of the optimal shares, it is easily checked that
this implies
s1 = p1, s2 = p2, s3 = 0, (55)
which in turn implies that the ﬁrst stage is equivalent to a one-shot rent seeking game
between agents 1 and 2, where the contest function is deﬁned by (??) and the prize is
equal to one. Using the proof of Alcalde and Dahm (2007, Theorem 3.1) enables us to
conclude that x1 is not a proﬁtable deviation.
Now, let us consider the deviation where agent 1 exerts eﬀort 0 < x1 < x∗
2 while agent
3 abstains from entering the recognition stage. Once again, this implies that agent 3
is still the agent with the cheapest vote at the second stage, which results in the same
characterisation of the optimal shares (than in the ﬁrst sub-case). The same conclusion
applies, which rules out x1 as a proﬁtable deviation. If 0 = x1, player 1’s vote is then
equal to that of player 3. One can easily show that the resulting payoﬀ for player 1 is 0,
21which is not a proﬁtable deviation.
A symmetric reasoning enables to conclude that agent 2 does not have a proﬁtable
deviation. It remains to prove that this is the case for the third agent as well. Let us
consider that this agent decides to exert eﬀort 0 < x3 < x∗ = 1
2c. Then the character-






for i = 1,2 (56)
and
s3 = (1 − δ)
(p3)
2
(1 − δ (1 − p3))(2 − δp3) − p3 (1 − p3)
. (57)
Now, coming back to the ﬁrst stage of the game, agent 3 chooses x3 such that it
maximises his expected payoﬀ, which is equal to:
EΠ3 = (1 − δ)
(p3)2
(1 − δ(1 − p3))(2 − δp3) − p3(1 − p3)
− cx3, (58)
which, due to p3 = x3
3x∗ = 2cx3
3 can be rewritten as:
EΠ3 = cx3{
(1 − δ)2cx3
9(1 − δ) + 3cx3(δ2 + δ − 1) + 2(cx3)2(1 − δ2)
− 1}. (59)
The present strategy does not constitute a proﬁtable deviation if and only this agent’s
expected payoﬀ is non positive, that is:
9(1 − δ) + 3cx3(δ2 + δ − 1) + 2(cx3)2(1 − δ2) − (1 − δ)2cx3 > 0, (60)
or
9(1 − δ) + cx3[3δ2 + 5δ − 5] + 2(cx3)2(1 − δ2) > 0. (61)
The ﬁrst thing to notice is that this inequality is satisﬁed as long as 3δ2 + 5δ − 5 is non






,1[ = ]δ,1[. (62)
In this case, the agent’s strategy x3 is not a proﬁtable deviation.
Now, let us assume that this is not satisﬁed. Let us notice that condition (61) is a
22polynomial expression of cx3 (of degree two), and introduce the following notation:
P(δ) =
 
3δ2 + 5δ − 5
 2 − 72(1 − δ)(1 − δ2) = 9δ4 − 42δ3 + 67δ2 + 22δ − 47. (63)
Then, provided that P(δ) < 0 we know that condition (61) will be satisﬁed necessarily. It
is easily checked that P(δ) is an increasing function and P(0) = −47 and P(1) = 9 > 0,
which implies that there exists a unique value δ ∈]0,1[ such that:
P(δ) < 0 ⇐⇒ δ ∈]0,δ[. (64)
Thus, for any δ ∈]0,δ[ we know that condition (61) is satisﬁed too, which rules out x3
as a proﬁtable deviation. One can easily check that there is a proﬁtable deviation for
the remaining values of the discount factor.
Finally, let us consider that agent 3 deviates by choosing an eﬀort level x3 ≥ x∗ = 1
2c.









































































































































































































































(1 − p3)[1 − δ + δ 1
2p3]
(1 − δ(p1 + 1
2p3))(1 − δ(p2 + 1
2p3)) − δ2p1p2
] − cx3. (74)
By deﬁnition of the recognition function, we deduce that p3 = 1 − 1
3cx3 and p1 = p2 =
p = 1


































} − cx3. (76)
The ﬁrst order condition is:
6
2 − δ
(3(2 − δ)cx3 + δ)
2 − c ≤ 0. (77)




(3(2 − δ)cx3 + δ)






































(1 + c). (80)




3c (1 + c) < 0.
If x3 = 1




2 (2 − δ) + δ
 2 − c ≤ 0. (81)























Hence there is no proﬁtable deviation with x3 ≥ x∗.
25To conclude the proof, it remains to notice that the other SSPE are symmetric to
the above structure: two players are active and exert the same level of eﬀort, while the
remaining agent abstains from entering the recognition stage and does not exert eﬀorts.
￿
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